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I. INTRODUCTION
Most theoretical approaches to copyright policy start from a highly
abstract perspective on property rights divorced from any particular
historical or cultural context. This critique starts from the opposite
extreme, the particular cultural context of African American music and
the specific historical period of early to mid-twentieth century musical
innovation. The seed of this critique was planted by a specific question
about a particular musician, naively asked nearly fifty years ago.
The summer after my junior year in college, John Coltrane
unexpectedly died at the age of forty. 1 A few years earlier, I had
 I would like to thank my colleagues at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School
of Law, especially Taunya Banks, Frank Pasquale, and Michael Van Alstine, for the helpful comments
they provided, and the other participants at a faculty workshop on February 7, 2013. Their thoughtful
criticisms greatly improved this paper.
1. On July 17, 1967. Ed Hazell, John (William) Coltrane, in 1 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY
OF JAZZ 491 (2d ed. 2002) (“He was, after Charlie Parker, the most revolutionary and widely imitated
saxophonist in Jazz.”); see generally id. at 491–94.
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become a passionate advocate of his music, and I knew enough jazz
history to see the parallels with the earlier, equally sudden and critical
loss of Charlie Parker in 1955 at the age of thirty-five.2 Given the
richly-endowed talents of Coltrane’s musical peers in the 1960s,
including Miles Davis,3 Sonny Rollins,4 Thelonious Monk,5 and Charlie
Mingus,6 I wondered how long it would take for another saxophonist to
arise from a new generation worthy enough to rank as Coltrane’s
successor. A similar transition occurred within a few years after
Parker’s death, and I expected it to take a half-dozen years at most.
Periodically, over the next several years I listened to the rising stars
anointed by the marketing departments of record labels, but even
musicians with amazing technical proficiency never seemed to achieve
the creative innovations that would place them in the first rank of
musical artists.7 Even Coltrane’s aforementioned great contemporaries
seemed to grow stale.
Since the late 1960s, jazz has not experienced the kind of successful
paradigm-changing innovations that arrived every decade or two and
marked the transitions from New Orleans-style to swing, from swing to
bebop, then to hard bop, and to the new thing. The music peaked just
when it had achieved mainstream legitimacy, when jazz artists were first
appointed to music faculties at colleges and received foundation grants
and music prizes. Since then, institutionalization has intensified. The
dual-credentialed classical and jazz trumpeter, Wynton Marsalis, has
enshrined his program at Lincoln Center in a substantial edifice, but it
might yet prove to be only a mausoleum.
During the past five decades, real jazz has continued to infiltrate
mainstream culture. Background music on the Weather Channel has
included the recordings of Monk, Mingus, and Coltrane. Jazz
practitioners have achieved ever-increasing technical proficiency and
formal credentials, but no further fundamental innovation has
succeeded. Each successive generation of Young Turks has so far failed
2. James Patrick, Parker, Charlie, in 3 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at
227–33.
3. Barry Kernfeld, David, Miles, in 1 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at
573–77.
4. Barry Kernfeld, Rollins, Sonny, in 3 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at
444–47.
5. Ron Blake & Barry Kernfeld, Monk, Thelonius, in 2 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ,
supra note 1, at 793–96.
6. Barry Kernfeld, Mingus, Charles, in 2 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1,
at 770–74.
7. “[N]obody has appeared in jazz since John Coltrane who has captured the attention of fans
and musicians and reshaped the music in the way that Armstrong, Parker, and to a lesser extent he and
Davis did . . .” James Lincoln Collier, Jazz, in 2 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at
389.
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to advance the music beyond the innovations achieved during the 1960s.
This conclusion, though controversial, might just reflect the biased
opinion of a senior citizen reminiscing about the golden musical era of
his youth. Musicologists have identified a common feature in the
formation of musical tastes. Most people establish their favorite musical
genre by the age of eighteen or twenty and often maintain that
preference for the rest of their lives.8 I “control” for this bias by
observing that just as Parker, Miles, Monk, and Coltrane had their
detractors in their heydays, they eventually changed the jazz paradigm
in fundamental ways. By 1964, Monk’s musical status had evolved
from that of a derided music outsider to a national icon, and he graced
the cover of Time Magazine.9 Miles Davis’s most critically acclaimed
album, the 1959 recording Kind of Blue, was certified quadruple
Platinum (4,000,000 albums in domestic sales) by the RIAA in 2008
with virtually no consistent marketing strategy or promotional effort. 10
The absence of such “objective” indications, which identify paradigmchanging artists, buttresses my conclusion that jazz has now stagnated
for decades.11
Wondering why this vitality had been lost, I explored the
musicological literature, considered my own observations, and
wondered whether copyright policies might have contributed to this
state of affairs. Has something changed in the jazz ecology? Did
copyright affect the changes that occurred? What role did the dramatic
increase in the scope of copyright protection wrought by the 1976 Act
play?12
The jazz economy had changed profoundly by the late 1960s. The
uniquely productive flowering of the 1960s might well have been the
deathbed rally of a dying jazz culture. In their primes, Coltrane, Miles,
Ellington, and Monk had working bands that provided full-time
employment with stable personnel over multiyear periods13 that played
8. DANIEL J. LEVITIN, THIS IS YOUR BRAIN ON MUSIC 226 (2006).
9. Blake & Kernfeld, supra note 5, at 794.
10. Results for Miles Davis, RIAA GOLD & PLATINUM SEARCHABLE DATABASE,
http://www.riaa.com/goldandplatinumdata.php (type “Miles Davis” in search box; then follow “Search”
hyperlink); ASHLEY KAHN, KIND OF BLUE: THE MAKING OF THE MILES DAVIS MASTERPIECE 193–94,
198 (2000).
11. “By the end of the 1960s many jazz fans were in despair; some announced the death of the
music, and others predicted that it was flowing into forms so disparate that it might as well be dead.”
Collier, supra note 7, at 385. See generally id. at 382–86.
12. The 1976 Copyright Act greatly increased the scope of protection by replacing the earlier
1909 Act’s requirement of publication with notice and compliance with other formalities with the
minimal requirement of fixation. It also replaced the initial twenty-eight year term followed by a
renewal term obtained by a separate renewal application with a single unitary term of life of the author
plus fifty (now seventy) years.
13. “No other composer [Ellington] in history had his own orchestra for half a century or
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before live audiences in clubs for extended engagements.14 Many other
bandleaders had similar arrangements, especially through the 1950s.15
By the 1970s, virtually no one could sustain such enterprises. Since that
era, few engagements of leading bands last more than a long weekend.16
Frequent perusal of the entertainment sections of major metropolitan
newspapers reveals that performing successive weekends in the same
locality is now rare, even for musicians with national reputations.
Musicians might work together several times a year, and a band might
coalesce for occasional weekend engagements or for recordings, but
individual musicians cobble together a living through other means.
Career paths previously closed to African American musicians have
opened up, including positions on academic faculties,17 with recording
studios, and highly visible roles in television orchestras on talk shows
and late night television.18 Careers have flourished economically, but
commanded comparable dedication from as many celebrated musicians.” GARY GIDDINGS, VISIONS OF
JAZZ: THE FIRST CENTURY 105 (1998). The preeminent baritone saxophonist of his era, Harry Carney,
spent forty-seven years with Ellington, from the age of sixteen until his death. Id. at 112. The Modern
Jazz Quartet stayed together for twenty years. Collier, supra note 7, at 380. The second great quintet
under Miles Davis’ leadership endured for four years with the same personnel, Wayne Shorter (1964–
1970), Ron Carter (1963–1968), Tony Williams (1963–1969), and Herbie Hancock (1963–1968).
Kernfeld, supra note 3, at 574. Exemplifying the deterioration of the jazz economy after the late 1960s,
his groups from 1969–1975 were less stable and “[o]ften the instrumentation and style of his everchanging recording ensembles (up to 14 players) diverged considerably from that of his working groups
(generally sextets or septets).” Id. Charlie Rouse (tenor saxophone) played with Monk for eleven years,
from 1959 through 1970. Barry Kernfeld, Rouse, Charlie, in 3 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ,
supra note 1, at 459.
14. Ellington came to national prominence during a more than three-year engagement (1927–
1931) at the Cotton Club in Harlem. GIDDINGS, supra note 13, at 109. In 1960 a New York club, the
Half Note, offered John Coltrane’s group twelve to fifteen weeks a year. BEN RATLIFF, COLTRANE:
THE STORY OF A SOUND 132 (2007). In 1960, the first full year that 3/4s of his classic quartet played
together (McCoy Tyner and Elvin Jones) they played eighteen full weeks at different American jazz
clubs, seven at the Half Note, three at the Jazz Workshop in San Francisco, one at the Apollo in
Manhattan, one at the Zebra lounge in Los Angeles, six at the Village Gate in Manhattan, and one at the
Showboat in Philadelphia. Id. at 134. In 1957, John Coltrane joined Thelonious Monk’s quartet in what
became a legendary engagement at the Five Spot Café from mid-July until December; the quartet
appeared for six nights a week, for four sets a night. ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, THELONIOUS MONK: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN ORIGINAL 225, 229, 239 (2009).
15. Ahmad Jamal, a noted pianist, recorded live his most popular and critically acclaimed album,
Live at the Pershing after he and his group had played the material recorded, five sets a night, six nights
a week for over a year at the Pershing nightclub. Marc Myers, A New Architecture for Jazz, WALL ST.
J. ONLINE (Sept. 28, 2013, 8:01PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324
492604579082994292232418.
16. “Most jazz musicians will tell you that this [extended engagements] is the crucial element
missing in jazz today; this is what is preventing bands from attaining a special coherence and preventing
bandleaders from becoming the properly seasoned role models and coaches. In jazz, experience is
everything.” RATLIFF, supra note 14, at 134.
17. Collier, supra note 7, at 388 (discussing the jazz education movement).
18. First Branford Marsalis and then Kevin Eubanks have hosted “The Tonight Show” band.
Berry Kernfeld, Marsalis, Branford (Iweanya), in 2 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at
712. Branford’s younger brother, Wynton Marsalis was the driving force behind and serves as artistic
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perhaps the roots have starved.
Was there something about the format of constant performance before
live audiences that made an essential contribution to the collaborations
that created successful musical innovations? Did dancing have
something to do with it? Live performance in the context of a
collaborative ensemble was a consistent presence in the development of
African American music. The field hollers that developed into the
blues19 and the religious music epitomized by the spirituals developed
before the invention of recording technology and without the benefit of
music literacy.20 Live performance was the only way to hear these
genres of music. Even hip hop, which significantly21 relies upon
previously recorded music and which began only in the 1970s (after
enactment of the 1976 Act), started in the context of live performance
by DJs, who performed their artistry with multiple turntables to sample,
repeat, and modify recordings live for dancers at parties.22 Such a series
of coincidences might indicate something more causal. Did copyright
law have something to do with this development?
Jazz, the most illustrious African American—and American—music,
reflects the live-performance and collaborative-ensemble tradition. In
its heyday before the transition to bop, jazz was the American popular
music, and it was primarily dance music,23 influenced by the mutually
responsive dynamic between musicians and dancers. In its formative
era, jazz partially evolved on the riverboats that sailed out of New
Orleans and other river towns on day and evening (moonlight) cruises
director of the jazz division at Lincoln Center. Berry Kernfeld, Marsalis, Wynton Learson, in 2 NEW
GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at 713.
19. Blues “emerged through the conflation of hollers and ballads. Hollers were freely
extemporized songs performed by individual workers in the South as accompaniment to field labor, and
they largely replaced group-labor work songs after the decline of the plantation system.” Paul Oliver &
Barry Kernfeld, Blues, in 1 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at 247.
20. Spirituals developed underground in the ante bellum South. RUSSELL SANJEK, 2 AMERICAN
POPULAR MUSIC AND ITS BUSINESS: THE FIRST FOUR HUNDRED YEARS 220–22, 269–73 (1988).
21. The recorded status of the music is significant, because after 1978 mere fixation creates a
protectable copyright interest without the notice and other formalities required under the previous
copyright act. The live performance and collaboration could occur relatively uninhibited by property
considerations because Hip-Hop developed on the margins of society among groups that were
essentially copyright “outlaws.”
22. See generally JIM FRICKE & CHARLIE AHEARN, YES YES Y’ALL: ORAL HISTORY OF HIPHOP’S FIRST DECADE (2002).
23. “By 1941, . . . big band jazz was the dominant popular music of the country: there were
hundreds of big bands, some 50 of which were nationally known, had large followings, recorded
regularly, and worked in dance halls and theater all the year round.” Collier, supra note 7, at 375–76. At
its birth, jazz was intimately linked to dancing. “Jazz mania [in 1917] was wedded to the dancing
craze. . . .” RUSSELL SANJEK, PENNIES FROM HEAVEN: THE AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 29 (1996). “The fast-dance mania and the new jazz music were shaped by
Afro-American culture, a fact completely disregarded by those who capitalized on their union.” Id. at
30.
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that featured dancing.24 Louis Armstrong apprenticed for three seasons
on these boats25 before departing for Chicago and making history with
his early Hot Five and Hot Seven recordings.26 On the riverboats,
incipient jazz bands with long serving personnel played for dancers,
sometimes for two cruises a day, each lasting from two to four hours.27
During the Swing Era, the big bands of Count Basie and Duke
Ellington played for many scores of dances every year, because jazz was
the popular music of this era, and it was primarily dance music. 28 Many
less famous bands played innumerable one-night stands on the Chitlin’
Circuit, the African American club circuit that developed throughout the
segregated South during the 1930s, ‘40s, and ‘50s.29 (John Coltrane
even spent some time on this circuit with the King Kolax band.30) One
of the leading touring groups, the Billy Eckstein band, in 1944 had as
members a number of talented innovators including Charlie Parker and
John (Dizzy) Gillespie,31 two of the most seminal figures in the
development of bebop, the music of the succeeding era in jazz.
Frequent, often daily, live performance for dancers was endemic to
jazz’s development as a popular music.
Bebop revolutionized jazz, making it a more complicated music,
rhythmically32 and harmonically, with chromatic harmony replacing
diatonic harmony.33 As a result of this complexity, it became less
accessible and lost its sway as America’s popular and dance music. Few
recordings document this transition, because it occurred during the years
of World War II, when both a musicians’ strike and the dispersal of
many musicians into wartime service severely curtailed the production
of music recordings.34 We do know, however, that during those years,
many of the innovators of bebop frequented Minton’s Playhouse in
Harlem to play at the regular Monday night and after-hours jam

24. See generally WILLIAM HOWLAND KENNEY, JAZZ ON THE RIVER (2005).
25. Id. at 64.
26. Id. at 47, 58–66.
27. Id. at 6, 23–24, 79.
28. Duke Ellington first came to national prominence during a three year engagement (subject to
interruptions for tours and a 1930 movie) at the Cotton Club in Harlem that included live radio
transmissions that helped spread exposure of his music. GIDDINGS, supra note 13, at 109.
29. PRESTON LAUTERBACH, CHITLIN’ CIRCUIT AND THE ROAD TO ROCK ‘N’ ROLL 12 (2011).
30. Id. at 81.
31. Berry Kernfeld, Eckstein, Billy, in 1 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at 683.
32. Berry Kernfeld, Bop, in 1 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at 270–71.
33. THE LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC 520–21 (Geoffrey Hindley ed., 1971).
34. Gordon Mumma et al., Recording, in 3 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ, supra note 1, at
375–77. “When the two-year recording strike ended in 1944, two new musics suddenly flowered, each
having mutated in relative privacy as enforced by the ban: in jazz, the byword was bebop, and Charlie
Parker was its avatar. . . .” GIDDINGS, supra note 13, at 252.
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sessions.35 Thelonious Monk, considered the greatest post-war jazz
composer, was the resident house pianist, and Kenny Clarke, an
originator of the bebop style of drumming, was the resident drummer.36
Successful creative innovation took place in an environment of intensive
frequent collaborative live performances and drove the subsequent
evolution into a more challenging aesthetic.37
Later, in 1957, John Coltrane joined Thelonious Monk’s quartet in
what became a legendary engagement at the Five Spot Café. From July
16th until December, the quartet appeared six nights a week for four sets
a night.38 Even a sophisticated audience needs time and repeated
exposure to discern new musical vocabularies. While live performance
was critical to the development of this new language, it proved too
forbidding for mass audiences and forfeited jazz’s role as America’s
popular dance music.39 It also appears that this new language
undermined jazz’s potential for future development. Live audiences
abandoned it, and the jazz economy could no longer support working
bands with stable personnel over several years and weekly engagements
throughout the year.
My disappointment at the absence of worthy successors to Coltrane
led me to suspect that something about the way the arts are performed
and created have consequences for their vitality. Vigorous and frequent
live performance in the presence of a live congregated audience appears
to frequently correlate with successful creative innovation. Creative
innovation is not solely the product of individual creative genius but is
itself a social process.40
No direct connection exists between specific copyright provisions or
court decisions and the decline in live performance that occurred in the
jazz ecology. The expanding scope and term of copyright protection
undoubtedly played a role. So, too, did the growing cultural legitimacy
of jazz, a consequence in part of civil rights successes, which raised
jazz’s profile. With greater prominence and acceptance into the
mainstream music culture came more emphasis on legalities and formal
contractual relationships. By creating property at the moment of
35. RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW & ACT 199–212 (1964).
36. Blake & Kernfeld, supra note 5, at 793.
37. Collier, supra note 7, at 376–78.
38. KELLEY, supra note 14, at 229.
39. The jazz mania that began in 1917 was wedded to the dancing craze. SANJEK, supra note 23,
at 29. In 1937 18,000 musicians regularly traveled to play in drinking establishments and for dancing.
Id. at 204.
40. Academics in their pursuit of creative and innovative scholarship implicitly subscribe to the
same view or why else would we traipse to conferences and workshops to make presentations to peers?
We consider the communication that occurs face-to-face with a live audience essential to the
development of our best work.
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authorized fixation, the 1976 Act inhibited the kind of free collaboration
that had earlier produced so much innovation in African American
music. Just as the desegregation of public accommodations undermined
the black business community by eliminating its monopoly hold on the
black consumer,41 it also undermined cultural infrastructures like the
Chitlin Circuit, which had given birth to so much musical innovation. It
is probably not coincidental that the most innovative musical form to
develop since the 1976 Act has been hip hop, a musical genre that
started as an outlaw music, both in the socioeconomic and legal senses.
Performed live at neighborhood parties by marginalized youth in
distressed areas, it originated outside the legal structure created by
copyright. These youths created a new musical form by sampling
existing music, a practice whose legality was dubious at best.
This Article proceeds in an unconventional manner. It starts from the
proposition that the content of the works of cultural expression that form
the core subject matter of copyright really matters. Incorporating
several interdisciplinary parts before engaging with the copyright statute
and suggesting reforms is necessary to provide a basis to understand this
Article’s proposed changes to copyright law. From the perspective that
cultural content matters, the true significance of these works lies in their
social, psychological, and even physiological effects rather than in the
economic revenues they generate. The current and dominant view of
copyright, perhaps influenced by the Constitution’s Copyright Clause
with its economic emphasis anchored by the monopoly grant, attempts
to devise incentives that maximize the production and distribution of
cultural works. The economic revenue generated by this activity is the
conventional measure of success. The large trade surplus generated by
our content industries, movies, records, and the like, indicates successful
policy. The approach broached here considers cultural health to be the
goal of copyright policy. As a goal, cultural health is more akin to
spiritual health or healthy nutrition; revenues are beside the point. In the
midst of an obesity epidemic, it would make no sense to measure food
policy success by our caloric intake or to recommend more sugar
subsidies. Measuring spiritual health by the revenues garnered by
religion is similarly inapposite. At the cusp of the Protestant
Reformation, the Catholic Church had burgeoning revenues, fueled by
the sale of indulgences. Despite the wealth, it was at a low point of
spirituality, hence the rebellion of Martin Luther. I argue that an
analogous misconception drives copyright policy.
Part II contains a descriptive analysis of the core subject matter of

41. Robert Suggs, Recent Changes in Black-Owned Business 25–26 (Joint Center for Pol.
Studies, Working Paper, 1986).
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copyright, which I call expressive culture,42 as a cultural phenomenon.
It analyzes the complexity of these cultural products, a complexity that
the Copyright Act ignores and which is alien to most copyright
scholarship. Disassembling expressive culture into some of its
components makes it possible to examine how it might function in
society. Part III considers whether, beyond the economic revenues it
generates, expressive culture really matters. Based upon its presence as
a phenomenon in all human societies and its costly use of resources even
in the most marginal-subsistence societies, this Part considers whether
expressive culture performs vital functions for individuals or societies.
It considers the possible evolutionarily adaptive functions of expressive
culture and identifies and examines some of the candidate functions.
Part IV focuses on the significance of live performance, because until
the recent introductions of technologies of reproduction, all culture was
live. Currently, almost all our cultural experience is through recorded
media, and this potentially momentous difference has been little noted.
Fueled by the suspicion that live performance plays an essential role in
creative innovation, this section discusses the implications for copyright
policy, arguing that live performance should have a privileged status.
Part V suggests how the current Copyright Act might be amended
with respect to two of the six exclusive rights of copyright to facilitate
some of the possible functions of expressive culture. It considers two
changes to the derivative work right. The first, requiring legislation,
would shorten its term, while the second would simply resolve the
doctrinal ambiguity surrounding whether an infringing derivative work
must be “fixed.” The second right to be modified, the public
performance right, would exempt certain live performances from its
scope. In making these proposals, this article makes no claim to
clairvoyance but merely seeks to pose some different questions, because
existing approaches give no satisfactory response to the following
query: What is expressive culture for?

42. The term expressive culture is not coextensive with the subject matter protectable by
copyright, because I use this term in a narrower sense. It encompasses only the works at the core of
copyright, i.e., novels, music, images, sculpture, dance, dramas and movies, and excludes thinly
protected factual and routine works, such as news reports, directories, and other works that make no
pretense of competing on the basis of aesthetic merit. I do include histories, although they are factual
works, but the ancient Greeks considered them among the greatest literary works, rivaling poetry and
drama; and creation myths are some of the earliest histories of all cultures. History as literature seeks to
achieve more, to convey understanding that affords insights into contemporary circumstances, cultures
and people beyond the specific time and place constraints of the work itself. Such histories are not
routine factual works.
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II. EXPRESSIVE CULTURE — A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PHENOMENON
Copyright treats expressive culture as a simple phenomenon. The
Copyright Act categorizes copyrighted works into eight categories43 and
assigns some, but not all, of the six exclusive rights to each category. 44
Expressive culture is not so simple. It consists of distinct forms,
including music, stories, dance, and visual images in both two and three
dimensions, and it is delivered by different media, such as printed
books, records, movies, live broadcasts or webcasts, and live
performances. These media appeal to different senses in varying
degrees and combinations. Expressive culture varies in thematic
content, intellectual accessibility, and the challenges it presents to our
mental processes. Possibly these differences correlate in some manner
with different or discrete functions of expressive culture or accomplish
those functions with varying degrees of efficacy. When one adds the
undeniable qualitative distinctions to this witches brew, the phenomenon
appears more magical than susceptible to objective analysis.
The Copyright Act makes no qualitative judgments about the property
it creates and protects beyond the most minimal.45 It essentially treats
all works as fungible, and subsumed within this neglect are several
unexamined issues.
Current copyright policy takes for granted that more is better.
Whether greater familiarity with fewer and “better” works confers more
of the benefits derived from expressive culture than fleeting exposure to
the enormous number of works available today remains an unexamined
question. It is difficult to believe that a point of satiety does not exist.
The sheer amount of expressive culture available to us far exceeds our
capacity to experience it. What do we gain from our technological
capacity to immerse ourselves in a nearly constant sea of music, images,
and stories? Current policy strongly implies that more is better, but if
the classics (from whatever era or civilization) suffice for expressive
culture to accomplish the full panoply of its functions, then we could
just rely on digitalization and the Internet to provide these works for free
and abolish copyright as just a source of friction and economic loss.
It is certainly possible that new works are essential because the
functional efficacy of expressive culture requires that the context of
works be contemporary. Thus acknowledged classics might not suffice
to achieve the relevant purposes of expressive culture. If such were the
case, the extraordinary increase in the term of protection since 1976
warrants revisiting. The current lengthy term removes existing works
43. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8) (2012).
44. Id. § 106 (2012).
45. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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from the potential inventory of raw material for derivative works for
such long periods that they have much less utility as the basis for new
works when they ultimately enter the public domain.
Expressive culture comes in different forms and appeals to different
senses, but existing law ignores the possibility that we might have
separate appetites for different media, i.e., stories told with the explicit
specificities of language in contrast to the more amorphous, implicit,
and emotional content of music. Dance, with its physical even
strenuous movements, may satisfy different needs than those met by the
quiet contemplation of a visual image or the shapely form of sculpture.
Culinary works that appeal to our sense of taste or works that appeal to
our sense of smell are currently outside the scope of copyright
protection, but such works might also satisfy specific appetites. If
expressive works are not fungible, then they might form a hierarchy of
some sort, and the priorities implicit in such a hierarchy should at least
inform copyright doctrine.
Copyright doctrine is agnostic with respect to the particular content of
expressive culture. We know that particular themes have resonated
through the ages. Classical Greek drama can move us as powerfully as
any contemporary work. The works of Shakespeare have remained both
critically respected and popular for centuries, and “the vast bulk of
fiction consists in personal interactions constituted primarily by
combinations of motives involving mating strategies, family dynamics,
and social strategies devoted to seeking status and forming coalitions.”46
Copyright policy ignores these recurrent themes and preferences. No
expressive work is more important than any other. Such a stance makes
sense if the value of expressive culture comes from the economic
revenues it generates; then, the marketplace establishes value. If,
contrary to this view, expressive culture performs critical functions for
individual human or social development, such a stance abdicates
responsibility merely because revenues are easily measured, and deeper,
difficult analysis is required to determine what might be the essential
functions of expressive culture.
The ease or difficulty of appreciation of expressive culture varies
considerably. Some works are immediately accessible, while others,
despite being immensely enjoyable, are challenging to the uninitiated.
Novices may be intimidated by the effort involved and might question
whether the experience is worth the cognitive effort. For example, we
enjoy certain sports only if we have achieved sufficient physical
conditioning; downhill skiing when your legs are out of shape is neither

46. Joseph Carroll, Wilson’s Consilience and Literary Study, 23 PHIL. & LITERATURE 361, 373
(1999).
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safe nor enjoyable. Similarly, some works are enjoyable only after we
achieve sufficient familiarity with the vernacular employed by the artist
or the genre.47 The efficacy of a work for a particular function of
expressive culture might vary along this dimension of challenge.48 The
experience of a challenging but ultimately enjoyable work might
exercise whatever neural functions are involved, so the experience
makes us better at whatever benefit it bestows.
We experience expressive culture in different social environments: in
solitude, among strangers, and among friends and family. This
experiential factor adds another dimension to our relationship with
expressive culture. Perhaps the social environment in which we
experience expressive culture affects its function. The social milieu
might even eclipse either its form or content. Alternatively, the
functional benefit of expressive culture might not arise from how we
consume it, but derive from how we create it. The passive consumption
of expressive culture only developed recently and contrasts with its role
in societies lacking sophisticated technologies of reproduction.49
III. COPYRIGHT REALLY DOES MATTER
The complexity of expressive culture is no more than an interesting
curiosity unless expressive culture50 matters more than the relief of
boredom. Of course copyright51 matters in the Philistinic sense to those
fortunate few with large royalty incomes; it matters even more to the
CEOs of media conglomerates that own the blockbuster content that
sustains executive bonuses and rich stock option awards. For the rest of
us, does it matter if all we ever get for content is the shallowest of pop
music or network TV?
John Coltrane died in 1967; I still remember where I was when I first
47. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
48. David Comer Kidd & Emanuele Castano, Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of
Mind, 342 SCIENCE EXPRESS 377, 377–80 (2013). Theory of the Mind (ToM) involves the characteristic
human ability to imagine the mental states of others. Id. at 377. It allows us to maintain and exploit
complex social relationships. Id. ToM has both an affective component (the ability to detect and
understand others’ emotions) and a cognitive component (the ability to infer the beliefs and intentions of
others). Id.
49. “[I]t is only in the last five hundred years that music has become a spectator activity—the
thought of a musical concert in which a class of ‘experts’ performed for an appreciative audience was
virtually unknown throughout our history as a species.” LEVITIN, supra note 8, at 251.
50. See supra note 42.
51. Copyright is different from Trademark and Patent. No one doubts that counterfeit
trademarked pharmaceuticals or aircraft parts can have social and economic consequences far beyond
the profits lost by rightful owners.
Patents either spur technological innovation or the
commercialization of new technologies, and they may prove critical to human survival, given threats
like global warming and pandemics of new pathogens like SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome),
MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) or the Ebola virus.
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heard the news. Was his passing any more significant than a candy
company discontinuing a favorite but esoteric jelly bean flavor? I would
like to think so, but so does almost every fan of any artist. Maybe every
other fan and I have just elaborately rationalized our investments of
time, energy, and money in a foolish endeavor. If all our music, movies,
and novels are just so much mind candy, then we can relax and stop
stressing over the ever-increasing term of copyright and its expanding
scope of protection. If copyright expansion strips consumers of their
ability to manipulate content and shift it to more convenient media, then
this result may have no more significance than any other failure to
satisfy inconsequential consumer preferences.
On the other hand, we certainly act as though the content of our
expressive culture matters. Totalitarian regimes on both the left and
right, whether Nazi fascists or Soviet communists, worked very hard to
create and support “authorized” expressive culture that conformed to
their ideological requirements and eliminate those that did not.52 Each
regime had a list of particular artists, schools, or genres it favored or
disparaged.53 Though totalitarian regimes were mistaken about so many
things, I suspect they were not mistaken about the significance of
expressive culture.
Democracies usually abjure such heavy-handed cultural policies.
Typically, they pick and choose which artists or industries to support
with public resources, but democracies usually do not suppress
unapproved sources. Many nations subsidize their individual artists and
arts groups, and some, e.g., the French, have for decades limited the
penetration of Hollywood’s movies into its film market.54 The United
States lags its developed peers in this respect, but millions of American
novels are sold each year, because teachers have made them required
reading in our schools. Almost all nations act as though their own
52. C. W. Casseneli, Totalitarianism, Ideology, and Propaganda, 22 J. POL. 68 (1960).
53. Collier, supra note 7, at 373 (“Jazz was never actually banned by Hitler’s regime, but it was
severely frowned upon, and by and large musicians had to be cautious in its performance.”). “Hitler’s
Germany had condemned jazz as pertaining to African-Americans and Jews and therefore non-Aryan. . .
.” Id. at 381. “During the Cold War Stalin forbade its [jazz] performance and the music went
underground, not only in the USSR, but also in other eastern countries under Soviet dominance. . . .” Id.
at 382.
54. “The modern history of the French cinema is the history of its protection and advancement
by the French government. Immediately after the Second World War, France imposed quotas on the
importation of American films and reserved a certain number of weeks per screen for French films.”
Richard Brody, The Future of French Cinema, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 3, 2013),
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/movies/2013/01/france-and-politics-of-movies.html. In 2012, France
subsidized 279 films with $1.75 billion in aid. Nicolas Vinocur, France Claims Victory as EU Upholds
State Subsidies for Film, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/assets/
print?aid=UKBRE9AD12P20131114. EU governments paid out three billion euros in 2012 to subsidize
the production of 1,299 feature films. Benjamin Fox, EU Pleases France, Widens Film Subsidy Rules,
EUOBSERVER (Nov. 15, 2013), http://euobserver.com/news/122114.
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expressive culture is uniquely valuable and worthy of preservation. This
value is so certain that no one bothers to identify why expressive culture
matters or how it matters?
Our First Amendment jurisprudence frowns on censorship of
expressive culture, but it reconciles the monopoly grant of copyright by
limiting the monopoly to the expression itself, leaving the ideas free to
be copied.55 While this idea/expression dichotomy leaves ideas freely
available in the marketplace of ideas, it also implies that expression
lacks fundamental significance. It is no more than an attractive frill,
merely instrumental, like a scent or brilliant color to attract the bee to
the flower.
A. Cheesecake?
Stephen Pinker has argued most famously that the arts are no more
than “strawberry cheesecake” that provide “intense artificial doses of the
sights and sounds and smells that ordinarily are given off by healthful
environments.”56
Such fitness-promoting environments were
themselves adaptive; but, according to Pinker, the arts are not adaptive,
because, despite their universal appeal, their proponents fail to specify
how the arts enhance our species’ chance of survival.57 Pinker criticizes
as a bad evolutionary explanation the reason for the purpose of music:
“It brings the community together.”58 He faults this reason because it
lacks any explanation for “[w]hy do rhythmic noises bring a community
together?”59
If expressive culture were no more than “cheesecake,” the
implications for copyright policy would be enormous. It becomes
difficult to explain why we need more new and original works? Far
more such works already exist than anyone could consume in an entire
lifetime. Digitalization and the Internet make the entire world’s
55. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
56. STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 525 (1997) (“We enjoy strawberry cheesecake, but
not because we evolved a taste for it. We evolved circuits that gave us trickles of enjoyment from the
sweet taste of ripe fruit, the creamy mouth feel of fats and oils from nuts and meat, and the coolness of
fresh water.”). The fruit, fats and oils contain necessary nutrients and do enhance survival.
57. Doubters like Stephen Pinker, fault explanations that fail to explain why expressive culture is
adaptive:
Many suggestions have been made—music bonds the social, group, coordinates action, enhances
ritual, releases tension—but they just pass the enigma along rather than explaining it. Why do
rhythmic sounds bond the group, dissipate tension, and so on? As far as biological cause and
effect are concerned, music is useless. It shows no signs of design for attaining a goal such as
long life, grandchildren, or accurate perception and prediction of the world.
Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 37.
59. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).

2015]

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT POLICY

1307

inventory of such creations available almost without cost to everyone,
anywhere with an Internet connection. By devoting the time and energy
that we do to copyright policy debates, compliance, and litigation, we
must believe, at least implicitly, that these works affect our lives in
important ways, and that new works offer essential benefits not found in
pre-existing works.
Whatever the original functions of expressive culture for our huntergatherer ancestors, its contemporary role may have changed or become
obsolete, or it may continue to change as society, social relationships,
and media technologies evolve. In the unlikely event that the sole role
of expressive culture was to foster group cohesion for offensive or
defensive purposes among small hunter-gatherer groups, then
professional police forces and military organizations have completely
supplanted this function. Complete obsolescence is unlikely, however,
simply because the fundamental social nature of the human species has
not changed, and all human societies continue to produce and consume
the phenomenon of expressive culture.
B. Adaptive Functions of Expressive Culture
Regarding functions of expressive culture,60 a number of possibilities
exist; but the core meaning of the term, expressive culture, encompasses
two categories. The first is fictional works, which by definition are not
true, although they may be based upon historical events. The second is
works with no explicitly intelligible content, e.g. music (without lyrics)
and much visual art, especially the nonrepresentational kind. Away
from the core are imaginative factual works; the best history and
biography achieve that status by imaginative selection and interpretation
of facts. The same can be said even of representational visual art. The
artist has selected from life but has interpreted the “facts” using color,
light, perspective, and composition to express something more than the
bare factual content of a surveillance photograph. Outside the scope of
the term, as used here, are bare factual works, such as news reports,
directories, instructional manuals, and the like that select facts based
upon what facts are readily available or necessary and not for expressive
purposes. While such works are presently protected by copyright, it is a
“thin” copyright.61 Most such works aspire only to convey immediately
useful information. While such works easily satisfy the minimal
standards for copyrightability, they rarely have value for more than a
few years, often no more than days or weeks—certainly not life plus
60. See supra note 42, where I define the term.
61. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][4] (2013).
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seventy years.
We know too little about the motivations that drive us to create
expressive works to claim that any list of their possible functions is
comprehensive, but the candidate functions discussed in this Part
identify some of the possibilities. Any or all of these functions may
operate on our social relationships or individual psychologies. Our lack
of knowledge means that we cannot even preclude the possibility that
the functional relevance of expressive culture might vary along a
spectrum that we have yet to discover. Candidate functions of
expressive culture fit roughly into two categories, those that develop our
individual skills and those that strengthen social ties among individuals
and augment group bonds. Both categories provide benefits that would
tend to increase an individual’s chances of survival and would thus be
adaptive.
C. Individual Development
Life’s lessons, wisdom gained from experience, come at a cost.
Exposure to expressive culture may accelerate our personal development
as individuals. We might vicariously learn valuable lessons from stories
without actually having to experience first-hand the narrated events. For
example, imagine a story cautioning against the potentially endless cycle
of revenge and retribution. This has survival value if actually
experiencing the narrated events would entail risks.62
Alternatively, imaginative works might enhance our social
intelligence, so we can more accurately predict the intentions of others,
again with significant survival benefits. Some recent research has
hypothesized that reading fiction helps the reader understand the mental
states of others.63 Undergirding the extraordinary capacity of the human
species to form and maintain complex social relationships is our evolved
ability to detect and understand the emotional states of others, and
perhaps uniquely among all species, to infer their beliefs and intentions.
Developing a theory of the mind of others is a critical developmental
milestone typically reached by humans around age of four. 64 This is
when a child understands that others can have false beliefs—when
another person’s subjective knowledge of a situation can diverge from

62. “The worlds of fiction though, pose fewer risks than the real world, and they present
opportunities to consider the experiences of others without facing the potentially threatening
consequences of that engagement.” Kidd & Castano, supra note 48, at 378.
63. Id. at 1-6.
64. DOUGLAS FRYE & CHRIS MOORE, CHILDREN’S THEORIES OF MIND: MENTAL STATES AND
SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING 92 (2014).
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reality.65 Even more remarkably, the research suggests that “literary”
fiction, with its complex characters, which compel readers to draw on
more flexible interpretive resources to infer the feelings and thoughts of
the characters, seems to at least temporarily enhance the research
subjects’ ability to accurately infer the beliefs and intentions of others. 66
Popular fiction, described as bestselling fiction with internally consistent
and predictable characters did not show such an effect. These results,
while preliminary, suggest that quality fiction of the conventional kind,
precisely the type of narrative that survives the test of time, provides
important benefits that would increase survival.67 Expressive culture
may thus help us cope with the changing threats in our physical and
social environments.
Significantly and independent of this effect, expressive culture may
also help us cope with the social and psychological stresses created by
new or unanticipated threats. Many sources of stress degrade our
immune system or otherwise negatively affect an individual’s health.68
Music, especially live music, has health benefits for infants in the
stressful environment of neonatal intensive care units. A meta-analysis
of music research with premature infants in neonatal intensive care units
showed large, significant, and consistent effects, and live music
conferred even greater benefits.69
The ever-increasing speed of technological and social change in
contemporary societies raises stress levels, making the stress-coping
function of expressive culture more important than ever. As a species,
we evolved over millennia during which change occurred very slowly,
and if expressive culture helped us accommodate to such change,
imagine what we need today when mores and living environments can
change drastically in less than a lifetime. How might it help?
Narratives might allow us to work through and vicariously experience
multiple iterations of the change and prepare us for real changes by
providing a kind of practice run that makes real changes more tolerable.
Alternatively, expressive culture might function through emotional
contagion, which, by enhancing social connections, allows us to

65. Id. at 159.
66. Kidd & Castano, supra note 48, at 378.
67. It also suggests that Learned Hand correctly established copyright doctrine for the
copyrightability of characters. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
68. Stress Weakens the Immune System, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (Feb. 23, 2006),
http://www.apa.org/research/action/immune.aspx; Understanding the Stress Response, HARV. HEALTH
PUBL’NS (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.health.harvard.edu/staying-healthy/understanding-the-stressresponse.
69. Jayne M. Standley, A Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of Music Therapy for Premature Infants,
17 J. PEDIATRIC NURSING 107 (2002); Jayne M. Standley, Music Therapy for the Neonate, 1 NEWBORN
& INFANT NURSING REV. 211 (2001).
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experience changes as a group, and provides the comforting reassurance
that we are not alone.
D. Group Bonds
Research from a number of disciplines—anthropology, public health,
physiology, and psychology—offer tentative answers to the challenge
posed by Pinker. One tentative answer from psychology relies upon
emotional contagion, that is, the alignment of the emotional states of
those experiencing the same event. Music, as we listen to it today,
autonomously and through recordings, does not produce the same
effects as music heard live and with a congregated audience, especially
when it is combined with rhythmic movement, i.e., dance, as music was
almost invariably so combined in many cultures.70 The physiological
evidence is abundant that music and dance perform the notable
psychological feat of synchronizing the emotional states of participants
in the activity, and some have argued that their very purpose was to
synchronize our emotional moods.71 Song and dance also generate
“euphoric highs, as well as feelings of happiness and warmth,” and may
“generate surges of opiates from the brain . . . .”72 The release of
endorphins during these activities would further cement social bonds
and conceivably allow the formation of even larger groups than
language.
Robin Dunbar argues that song and dance strongly
contributed to social cohesion and helped to keep the large groups that
“emerging humans needed for their survival” from fragmenting.73
Aesthetic works plausibly provide mechanisms for social bonding
that our primate ancestors lacked, and such a mechanism provides a
possible explanation for the ability of early humans to organize and
maintain substantially larger groups than nonhuman primates.74 Thus,
in their original forms, live performances and congregated audiences
who participated as active collaborators in performances might have
70. LEVITIN, supra note 8, at 251 (“One striking finding is that in every society of which we’re
aware [contemporary societies with hunter-gatherer lifestyles], music and dance are inseparable.”).
“The Sesotho verb for singing, . . . as in many of the world’s languages, also means to dance; there is no
distinction, since it is assumed that singing involves bodily movement.” Id. at 7.
71. See, e.g., ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING, GOSSIP, AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 142–48
(1996) (suggesting that song and dance help to keep large groups that “emerging humans needed for
their survival” from fragmenting); id. at 182 (citing cognitive scientist Geoff Miller for the suggestion
that artistic skills evolved to charm and hold on to prospective mates); id. at 147 (“The anthropologist
Chris Knight has argued that the use of ritual to co-ordinate human groups by synchronizing everyone’s
emotional states is a very ancient feature of human behavior, and coincides with the rise of human
culture and language.”).
72. Id. at 146.
73. See id.
74. Id.
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been adaptive.
If expressive culture facilitates social connections, then it can enhance
survival in at least two ways. First, an individual with more social
connections has more allies and resources to draw upon in times of
scarcity or conflict.75 Strengthened group cohesion augments defensive
or offensive capabilities in circumstances of group conflict. It is
probably not coincidental that the genre of military music exists.
Battlefields have featured instruments from bagpipes to war drums. In
less deadly contexts, sports teams and their supporters sing fight songs.
Music and dance, through emotional contagion, can synchronize the
emotional states of groups, thereby enhancing group prowess. Second,
social connections themselves, even in the absence of conflict or
scarcity, have well-documented beneficial health effects, because selfperceived social isolation has well-documented physiological effects
that increase morbidity and mortality. 76
From this perspective,
copyright policy has significant public health implications.
If expressive culture functions to inhibit social isolation, then
performing live in front of an aggregated audience of music fans should
prove a fruitful environment. The resulting emotional contagion should
have beneficial health consequences, especially when compared to the
alternative, listening in solitude to a recording of the same music.77
Alternatively, expressive culture might reduce conflict or tensions
between individuals and groups by facilitating empathy. The experience
of another’s expressive culture accomplishes an exchange of viewpoints
in a uniquely effective manner.78 Iacoboni, based upon neurological
experiments with Macaque monkeys, has hypothesized controversially
that observing another person perform an action causes a similar but less
intense neurological response in the brain as though the observer were
herself performing the action, creating a neurological basis for the
expression of empathy.79
The relevant evidence in support of each possible function for
expressive culture varies but in all cases is far from definitive, often
only suggestive.80 While these qualifications might suggest that reform
75. Such an individual also has more claimants for his own resources and allegiance in times
when these claimants experience conflict or scarcity.
76. Louise C. Hawkley & John T. Cacioppo, Loneliness Matters: A Theoretical and Empirical
Review of Consequences and Mechanisms, 40 ANN. BEHAV. MED. 218 (2010).
77. Simultaneous use of social media conceivably might facilitate emotional contagion even with
disaggregated audiences experiencing recordings.
78. To extend this hypothesis to the medium of drama, a function of this particular medium
could lie in the empathetic response to the circumstances of the observed.
79. MARCO IACOBONI, MIRRORING PEOPLE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HOW WE CONNECT WITH
OTHERS (2008). See also Kidd & Castano, supra note 48, at 377, 380.
80. Expressive culture might strengthen pair bonds between individuals of the opposite sex. It
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proposals would be premature, copyright policy has historically been
formulated in an evidentiary vacuum.81
E. Evaluating Expressive Culture: A Different Metric
If expressive culture has critical functions, then some works may
fulfill particular functions better than others.82 Comparative functional
efficiency or success measures the quality of expressive culture across a
different spectrum than media executives, fans, or critics typically use.
Media executives emphasize the revenues generated by strong property
rights. Consistent with this orientation, policy analysts and copyright
scholars focus on economic incentives in order to predict consumer
choices in copyright markets. Neither of these approaches identifies
better copyright policies, unless maximizing monetary returns for
content owners is the ultimate purpose of copyright.
Critics make aesthetic judgments, but these too fail to identify those
works that most effectively accomplish the functions of expressive
culture. And which critics? Critical opinions vary enormously and
often change over time, so reliance on critical judgments provides no
guidance. Even fans, whose intuitive and visceral responses generates
their enthusiasm, might miss the mark, just as consumers who choose
the tastiest food, with the most fat, sugar, and salt, often do not select the
most nutritious food. A functional approach to copyright casts policy
formulation adrift from its usual moorings.
Consequently, the copyright debate must extend beyond the usual
economic concerns involving the relative efficiency of the economic
incentives and burdens created by the copyright monopoly grant. The
debate must include a number of novel issues, and we must consider
how such issues might affect the contours of copyright law. Whatever
the functions of expressive culture, generating a commercially attractive
monetary return was not the original purpose of its production, and we
know this because expressive culture pre dates the invention of both
money and mercantile trade.
The current copyright policy debate often takes place in the context of
“data,” which may be purely anecdotal or even spurious. In attempting
to compile data quantifying the economic impact of counterfeit
may have something to do with sexual selection as Darwin famously believed.
81. The Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted in part to harmonize U.S. law with European law.
Harmonization was pursued to capture the increase in economic revenues that resulted from the 1976
Act’s expansion of protection, increase in the term of protection, and elimination of formalities.
Reformers gave no thought to the cultural costs of such changes, even though the 1909 Act had
transformed us from a cultural backwater into an international powerhouse.
82. Kidd and Castano found that literary fiction provided benefits that popular fiction lacked.
Kidd & Castano, supra note 48, at 379.
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trademarked goods and pirated copyrighted goods, a perennial topic of
media coverage and press releases from the trade associations of the
content industries, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), in
detailing the problems it encountered, acknowledged that the task was
challenging primarily because of the lack of available data on the
extent and value of counterfeit trade. . . . data have not been
systematically collected or evaluated and, in many cases,
assessments ‘rely excessively on fragmentary and anecdotal
information; where data are lacking, unsubstantiated opinions are
often treated as facts.’. . .
....
Three commonly cited estimates of U.S. industry losses due to
counterfeiting have been sourced to U.S. agencies, [the FBI, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the Customs and Border
Protection] but cannot be substantiated or traced back to an
underlying data source or methodology. . . .
....
These estimates . . . continue to be referenced by various industry
and government sources as evidence of the significance of the
counterfeiting and piracy problem to the U.S. economy. 83
The use of anecdotal or speculative evidence to guide copyright
reform is well within the mainstream of copyright history. The 1976
Copyright Act, the first comprehensive rewrite of Copyright since 1909
and the product of more than two decades of Copyright Office study and
legislative hearings, radically changed American copyright law in order
to harmonize it with the much longer terms and lack of formalities
prevalent in European copyright.84 We abandoned a system that brought
American culture from a position of being ignored by the rest of the
world to one of a cultural superpower, and we adopted the system of
those we had just vanquished. You will look in vain for any
comparative analysis that examined whether the benefits of
harmonization with Europe would exceed the losses from abandoning
our unique system. Instead, what swayed Congress were the enhanced
revenues that would accrue to copyright owners from extended terms, a
tautological conclusion.
83. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 16, 18–19 (2010) (quoting from a 2008 OECD report,
The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy).
84. While many have emphasized the considerable continuity between the 1909 and 1976 Acts,
the exponential expansion of copyright protection by premising it upon fixation instead of publication
with notice, worked a radical cultural transformation whose long term consequences are only beginning
to become manifest.
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Before the complete rewrite of the Copyright Act that occurred in
1976, a more comprehensive comparative analysis between the U.S.
system and the European approach would have looked beyond the
effects on the revenues generated by existing copyright properties. It
would have considered the effects on expressive culture more broadly
and grappled with the fundamental questions: What are the functions of
expressive culture, and how best should they be accomplished? An
attempt to answer such a question must necessarily rely on preliminary
and even speculative analysis.
For copyright policy to assist rather than inhibit the functions of
expressive culture, we must examine particular aspects of expressive
culture. Different policy recommendations result depending upon which
aspects we prioritize. Our understanding of the functions of expressive
culture is limited and preliminary, so the analysis raises more questions
than answers, but finding the right questions is a necessary step to
understanding the phenomenon of expressive culture.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LIVE PERFORMANCE
[I]n some ways there has been no more musically destructive force
than the phonograph.
Of all the ways in which music changed over the course of the
twentieth century, the most fundamental was the shift from being
something people played to something they consumed and from
being part of a larger experience to being a thing that is often
heard alone and out of any set context. Audio recordings, simply
by existing, separated sound from performance. Until recording,
music did not exist without someone playing it, and as a result
music listening was necessarily social.85
Music recordings have drastically, perhaps catastrophically, altered
the experience of music and disrupted the historic African American
pattern in which creative innovation took place in an environment of
intensive live performance, often for dancers. While this paper is too
brief to fully explore whether this pattern extends to other genres of
music and expressive culture generally, some evidence hints that it
might. The early history of rock and roll shows its origins springing
from the Chitlin’ Circuit, the network of performance venues that
developed in the segregated South; one top group stayed together for
over a year and in one stretch of one-night stands played thirty-one days

85. ELIJAH WALD, HOW THE BEATLES DESTROYED ROCK ‘N’ ROLL: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY
OF AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC 12–13 (2009).
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straight.86 The Beatles developed their music in the bars of Hamburg
over a two-year period, beginning with a 3 ½ month residency,
suggesting a parallel development.87 Punk rock and other variants of
contemporary popular music seem to have developed from a specific
scene and frequent live performance engagements.88 The origins of
country and folk music lie in the era prior to the advent of commercial
recordings after World War I, necessarily relying upon live
performance.
Further back in time, long before sound recordings, when only music
notation recorded approximations of musical sounds, the greatest
composer of his era, Johann Sebastian Bach, was also a working
musician. Appointed to various musical posts in important churches and
the courts of the higher nobility,89 his daily duties included
responsibility for the musicians and choirs of his patrons.90 Many
classical European composers of his era, when so much music
performed functions of worship, pageantry for the nobility, or household
entertainment for the wealthy and powerful were nurtured in similar
composing and performing environments.91 Composers in this era could
explore their ideas with actual musical performance simultaneously with
creation.
In contrast, modern classical composers work in isolation, rarely
hearing their compositions performed even once and almost never with
the frequency that permits ideas to be developed with the responsive
participation of sophisticated audiences.92 To counteract this isolation
of the composer from live performance, Duke Ellington subsidized his
band (when it was no longer economical to tour) with revenues from his
music royalties to maintain them as a working unit in order to
immediately hear and develop his musical ideas.93 Classical music’s
rare performance of contemporary works, the unpopularity of such
86. LAUTERBACH, supra note 29, at 159, 161 (Roy Brown assembled a band composed of Ernie
Roth, Edward “Lil’ Tatum” Sentino, Teddy Riley, Johnny Fontenette, and Leroy “Batman” Rankins that
came to be known as the Mighty Mighty Men).
87. MARK LEWISOHN, THE COMPLETE BEATLES CHRONICLE: THE DEFINITIVE DAY-BY-DAY
GUIDE TO THE BEATLES’ ENTIRE CAREER 28–29, 42–43 (2010).
88. See generally Will Straw, Systems of Articulation, Logics of Change: Communities and
Scenes in Popular Music, 5 CULTURE STUD. 368 (1991).
89. THE LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC, supra note 33, at 197–201.
90. Id.
91. Major Baroque Composers, MUSIC OF THE BAROQUE, http://www.baroque.org/baroque/
composers.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
92. “Contemporary classical” music is practiced mostly in universities; it is listened to by almost
no one; it deconstructs harmony, melody, and rhythm, rendering them all but unrecognizable; it is a
purely intellectual exercise and save for the rare avant-garde ballet company, no one dances to it either.”
LEVITIN, supra note 8, at 257.
93. GIDDINGS, supra note 13, at 105–06.
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works, and the atrophy of its audience94 despite enormous prestige and
considerable public subsidies might well reflect the isolation of its
composers from both performers and audiences.
Hints of the same relationship between frequent live performance and
creative innovation are also found in the other creative arts. Consider
theater. Shakespeare was not only perhaps the greatest playwright, but
he was also an actor, part owner of a playhouse, and principal
playwright for the leading acting company of his day. 95 His acting
troupe performed a different play each day, introduced as many as
twenty new plays annually, and revived old favorites.96 Shakespeare
constantly revised his plays in response to audience reaction, and he
wrote for the most experienced playgoers in history.97
While modern theaters perform a single play for months, even years if
successful, a variant of Shakespeare’s creative performance practice
survives in contemporary theater. Productions bound for Broadway use
out-of-town preview performances to refine their productions and test
audience reactions before Broadway openings. 98 Once a play opens,
collaboration and revision typically ends. 99 At an earlier stage of a
play’s development, local theater groups sometimes use theater
workshops to help playwrights develop their ideas.100 The awardwinning Rent used such a process.101
Even in the visual arts, practices have changed. In fields like painting
and sculpture, the modern artist usually works alone in her studio, a
departure from the norms of the past. Artists like Rembrandt,
Michelangelo, and Rubens employed numerous apprentices and
artisans,102 who accomplished much of the routine work; these skilled
artists-in-training must have had opinions on the progress of particular
works and probably communicated these views among themselves and
to their respective principals. Art historians must therefore often
attribute the more mundane parts of iconic works to anonymous artisans
laboring in their masters’ studios.103 When so much art served religious
purposes and was created in public spaces, e.g. frescoes in churches, a
94. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW A NATION ENGAGES WITH ART 12–13 (2013).
95. JAMES SHAPIRO, A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: 1599, at xviii, 3–6 (2005).
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id.
98. See generally Patrick Healy, Musicals Born on Broadway Cause Jitters (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/theater/13preview.html?pagewanted=all.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
102. Stan Sesser, The Art Assembly Line, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (June 3, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303745304576357681741418282.
103. Id.
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wider audience would have had myriad opportunities to observe and
comment upon the emerging images.
This would have been
performance art in a literal sense.
In motion picture production, which has no pre-20th century
antecedent and which has a history of successful aesthetic innovation,
we also find a similar kind of intense collaboration among a multitude of
creative participants. Directors, actors, screenwriters, cinematographers,
casting directors, make-up artists, costumers, sound engineers, and
others all make creative contributions to the final product.104 Moreover,
shooting on location, away from ordinary distractions, permits the kind
of focused involvement over weeks and months that must be the most
intensive creative collaboration occurring in our modern arts
economy.105 The medium itself is an audio/visual recording; while some
productions are tested with live, congregated viewing audiences prior to
the final edit and commercial release of the film, the production process
involves a high degree of collaboration among participants on the
production set.106 While this medium lacks a live performance
counterpart, the presence of so many creative collaborators on the set
during production may compensate for the lack of a live audience.
A. Advantages of Live Performance
Recorded expressive culture is a phenomenon of the modern world,
and current recording technologies have fundamentally changed the way
people experience culture.
Before the invention of recording
technologies, live performers narrated stories, acted out dramas, and
performed dances or music with congregated audiences. Until one
hundred years ago, with the exception of visual images and silent
reading of printed texts, all culture was live. Even with respect to
reading, most people experienced written texts through someone else
reading aloud. This was a popular form of entertainment among the
literate and a necessity among the illiterate, who constituted an
overwhelming majority of the world’s population and a significant share
of the U.S. population. Today, we experience our expressive culture
largely through recordings; live performances have become infrequent.
This change might prove a momentous one, but it has occurred largely
unnoticed and has provoked little comment or analysis.107
104. See, e.g., SUSAN HAYWARD, CINEMA STUDIES: THE KEY CONCEPTS 124 (2000).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., id. at 464.
107. The commentary that does exist concerns the economic displacement of unionized
professional musicians. Musicians unions fought a losing struggle over decades. See generally Vern
Countryman, The Organized Musicians: II, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1949) (detailing the American
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The ubiquity of replacing live performance with recordings may most
significantly impact the functions of expressive culture. In the
communications field, considerable research has documented the
superiority of face-to-face communications over substitute technologies
for the conveyance of implicit information. In one experiment groups of
six subjects played a game in which everyone could earn money by
cooperating. One set of groups interacted face-to-face, while another set
interacted electronically. The groups meeting in person cooperated
better and earned more money, and the groups that communicated only
electronically fell apart as members pursued personal gain over the
groups’ needs. “Face to face contact leads to more trust, generosity, and
cooperation than any other sort of interaction.”
For better or worse, recordings change the experience of expressive
works. Recordings bring an exponentially wider selection of works to
audiences, permit us to repeatedly experience works at our convenience,
and allow the creation of forms of expression, such as motion pictures,
that are impossible to perform live.
Unfortunately, recording
technologies also ossify the content of the work, forestall
communication between performers and audiences, and limit the
number of senses engaged when the audience experiences the work.
Recording technology also can directly affect the content of particular
works, because artists can use recording techniques, such as
overdubbing their own voices to create duets with themselves, to make
works that cannot be performed live.108 Access to recordings by
audiences has also changed what composers create.
Classical
composers particularly no longer compose to exploit the market for
amateur musicians as they did throughout the nineteenth century. 109
Recordings also permit composers to create more challenging content,
because the audiences can repeatedly access the work, typically at no
incremental cost, at their own convenience.
Recordings have also changed the environments in which we
experience expressive culture. Music, dramas, and stories, when
experienced live, almost exclusively occur with a congregated audience,
often large ones. Yet we typically experience recorded works in small
Federation of Musicians battles against the technological competition of motion pictures, phonographs,
radios, jukeboxes and television); Robert A. Gorman, The Recording Musician and Union Power: A
Case Study of the American Federation of Musicians, 37 SW. L.J. 697 (1983); Chris Milazzo, Note, A
Swan Song for Live Music?: Problems Facing the American Federation of Musicians in the
Technological Age, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 557 (1996) (highlighting the unique threat to musicians posed
by synthesizers and digital audio tape).
108. They can even dub over old recordings and create duets with long dead performers, as
Natalie Cole did with her father, Nat “King” Cole. NATALIE COLE, UNFORGETTABLE: WITH LOVE
(Electra/WEA 1991).
109. See ROBERT PHILIP, PERFORMING MUSIC IN THE AGE OF RECORDING 7 (2004).

2015]

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT POLICY

1319

groups of acquaintances or, ever more frequently, in solitude. Large
audiences for mass media recordings consist of geographically or
temporally dispersed strangers. A live, congregated audience permits
the phenomenon of emotional contagion, in which the emotional mood
of the audience synchronizes. Television sitcoms add laugh tracks to
exploit this phenomenon.
Audiences for recordings necessarily engage the work more passively
than live audiences. They might respond to works, but they cannot
communicate their responses to the performers. Segregated in time and
place from the performers, they cannot collaborate in the performance.
In contrast, live performances allow performers and audiences to
respond dynamically to each other. Just as when jazz was the popular
dance music, dancers provided immediate feedback to performers of the
utility and pleasure derived from musical performances and what
worked artistically. Live audiences could, in theory, limit themselves to
a passive role, but the mere presence of a live audience, passive and
utterly disengaged, would communicate powerfully to the performers, so
only recordings have truly passive audiences. The creative dynamic
between performers and audiences might have even more significance
than the content of the work performed.
Compared to the experiences of live audiences, audiences for
recordings engage fewer senses. Recordings may engage only a single
sense, when listening to music, or two senses, when watching a movie,
but as yet no recordings involve the senses of touch or smell. The
sensory data from touch, the vibrations from the movements of
performers, or the heat and smells of other bodies in the crowd are lost.
The distinction between live and recorded performances also has
significance for the content of what can be communicated. Evidence
from the research of economic geographers suggests that face-to-face
encounters communicate nuances that escape transmission as explicit
content by various media.110 Critical implicit content is lost when
telephone or video conferencing is used in lieu of face-to-face
communication, even when the explicit content is the relatively
objective content of scientific discourse.111 Technologies such as video
conferencing have been shown to be complementary to face-to-face
collaboration rather than substitutes for it.112 This is why the most tech
savvy early adopters on the planet still pay premium real estate prices in
order to cluster together in Silicon Valley.113 The music, fiction, drama,
and art that form the core of expressive culture probably contain a
110.
111.
112.
113.

EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 34–38 (2011).
See id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
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greater proportion of implicit content than the science and engineering
communications that predominate in Silicon Valley. The physical
proximity of performers and audiences, their face-to-face exposure, and
the resulting multisensory experience of each other permit more
communication to occur, especially of implicit content.
The distinction between live and recorded performances also has
physiological significance. Different things happen in the brain when
we experience a live performance instead of a recording of the same
event.114 Brain scientists have demonstrated, using electrodes implanted
in macaque monkey brains, that different patterns of neurons fire when
monkeys watch an event live compared to a video recording of the same
event.115 Depending upon what the functions of expressive culture are
in human societies, this distinction might warrant differential legal
treatment.
B. Advantages of Recordings
While recordings cannot match live performances as an immersive
multisensory experience, recordings offer unique advantages.
Recordings provide access to dead artists or niche artists when audience
interest would not support a live tour. They allow us to experience
works conveniently, without the logistical complications that live
performances entail. We do not have to arrange childcare, find parking,
or negotiate with scalpers for sold-out performances. Recordings permit
us to experience far more works than we could ever see or hear live.
They make expressive culture available without the temporal or
geographic constraints that limit live performances.
If, as some speculate, expressive culture enhances empathy116
between individuals and groups, recordings might better extend the
range of empathetic experiences, because recordings offer greater
geographic and temporal variety.117 While the multi-sensory intensity
of a live performance might generate a more powerful experience, the
variety of expressive culture available on recordings might trump
intensity.
Recordings also allow the repeated experience of works, which
114. MARCO IACOBONI, supra note 79, at 160.
115. Id. at 161.
116. Maya Djikic et al., Reading Other Minds: Effects of Literature on Empathy, 3 SCI. STUDY
LITERATURE 28 (2013).
117. “People learn from fiction about the human psychology, . . . through taking the perspective
of the characters and to experience the events as if it is the reader’s own experience . . . [enabling them]
to understand other people across time and space, an opportunity which is not readily available in daily
life.” P. Matthijs Bal, Martijn Veltkamp, How Does Fiction Reading Influence Empathy? An
Experimental Investigation on the Role of Emotional Transportation, 8 PLOS ONE 2 (2013).
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increases familiarity and, in sophisticated works, reveals nuances,
details, and connections that may have escaped initial notice. This
might permit less-accessible works to achieve recognition and
popularity. If more sophisticated works generate more of the benefits
that expressive culture provides, then this expansion of benefits derived
from expressive culture would represent a previously unavailable
benefit.118
Recordings also enable the creation of entirely new types of works
that could not be performed live. Motion pictures are the most prevalent
example. The storytelling techniques of movies, the visual grammar of
extreme close-ups, cross cutting edits, and dramatic shifts in place and
time, might stimulate the human brain in novel ways and would be
impossible to stage in a live drama. Forrest Gump incorporated and
manipulated live documentary footage in fictional scenes to place the
principal character in newsreels from the period. Documentaries can
reconstruct historical reality in newly perceptive ways. Special effects
and computer generated images allow movies to tell stories that live
theater could never replicate.
Recording technologies, especially software, expand the pool of
artists. Without being able to carry a tune or play a musical instrument,
almost anyone can record a musical album using a number of software
products that eliminate or correct off-key notes or out-of-time beats. A
layperson can assemble music from snippets available in public files and
create a symphony without even possessing basic music literacy.
Photography and videography have witnessed similar advances.
Software now corrects mistakes that professional photographers spent
years learning how to avoid. Girl Talk, the stage name of mashup artist
Gregg Gillis, represents the logical extension of recording
technologies.119 He performs electronic music live by using a computer
to produce mash up remixes of recorded samples of songs.120 Such
work might exemplify an innovation that achieves the functions of
copyright in new and better ways. It might cause unique groups or
patterns of neurons to fire in the brain that have no comparable
equivalent in live performances. Or, it might merely demonstrate how
recordings continue to impoverish expressive culture by distancing us
even further from the live collaboration at its roots.

118. See Kidd & Castano, supra note 48, at 377–80.
119. Nick Bilton, One on One: Girl Talk, Computer Musician, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2011 8:30
AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/28/one-on-one-girl-talk-computer-musician/?_php=
true&_type=blogs&_r=0%7Cauthor=Nick.
120. Id.
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V. MAKING COPYRIGHT MORE FUNCTIONAL
The following analysis suggests how modest reductions in the scope
of the copyright monopoly might align copyright policies more with the
needs of our social species. Achieving this realignment requires
modifying two of copyright’s six exclusive rights, the derivative work
right121 and the public performance right.122 Two changes are necessary
in the derivative work right; the first requires legislative action, while
the second requires only judicial resolution of a statutory ambiguity.
Congress would need to shorten the duration of the derivative work
right, something that sounds simple but is conceptually quite difficult.
The judicial interpretation needed would resolve the doctrinal ambiguity
concerning whether an infringing derivative work must also be fixed.
Regarding the public performance right, statutory change is needed to
reduce the scope of the public performance right. I propose creating a
royalty-free zone for live performances, provided no fixation occurs.
Making such performance environments exempt would allow both
experimentation and collaboration with audiences with relatively modest
consequences for existing claims on copyright revenue. The other four
exclusive rights can retain their current lengthy terms.
A. Reduced Duration of the Derivative Work Right
If expressive culture functions to help us cope with the stresses
produced by changes in our physical and social environments, then this
function has significant implications for copyright terms. If it
accomplishes this function by providing vicarious experiences to
acclimatize us to those changes, then a copyright term of life plus
seventy years locks away relevant raw material for far too long. Too
many works remain unavailable until the passage of time and changes in
technology and social mores have so transformed society that formerly
insightful works have become impenetrable.
Our culture and society changes rapidly, driven by the frenetic pace
of technological innovation. In less than one hundred fifty years our
society has evolved from rural patterns of settlement and an agrarian
economy, through urbanization and industrialization, to the current
exurban sprawl and information-services-based economy. If expressive
works play a critical role in enabling both individuals and society to
adapt to rapid change, then copyright policy has increased in
importance. In earlier eras, change proceeded much more slowly, and in
our prehistoric past—the great bulk of time during which evolution
121. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
122. Id. § 106(4).
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molded the human animal and our use of expressive culture—change
occurred at a glacial pace. Rapid change would seem to increase our
reliance on expressive culture to help mediate the psychological stresses
and social tensions created by such speedy transitions. The increasing
pace of technological and cultural change should imply a shorter term of
copyright, not the ever-lengthening term of present circumstances.123
Historically, the arts have served as key interpreters of the human
experience, helping us make sense of our lives, our environment, and
our social relationships. For authors to create the works that fill this
role, they need access to the immediate past, not just the distant past,
beyond roughly one hundred years under the current Act.124 The
cultural meaning of works created only a few decades ago now escapes
contemporary audiences. The rigid political and sexual mores of
Hollywood that constrained its subject matter throughout its heyday are
incomprehensible to contemporary audiences. The current revival of
interest in African-American music forms, from jazz to blues to do-wop,
involves audiences listening to this music without knowing the racial
caste divisions out of which this music grew and which often fueled its
expression.125 Lengthy copyright terms reduce the relevance of many
works by the time they eventually enter the public domain. In an era of
such rapid change, the less relevant the public domain becomes, the less
value it has as raw material for subsequent authors. For copyright to
123. The 1790 Act, Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, established an initial term of
fourteen years and a renewable term of fourteen years. The 1831 Act, Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1,
16, 4 Stat. 436 ,439, lengthened the initial term to twenty-eight years and kept the renewal term at
fourteen years. The 1909 Act, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1080–1081, kept the
initial term at twenty-eight years and lengthened the renewal term to twenty-eight years. Then Congress
changed the term to the life of the author plus fifty years, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572 (1976),
before finally lengthening the term to life of the author plus seventy years, Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827-28 (1998).
124. Shortening the term of copyright would also reduce the problem of orphan works.
125. One of Billie Holiday’s most iconic and controversial songs was Strange Fruit, written by
Abel Meeropol under the pseudonym Lewis Allan:
Southern trees bear a strange fruit,
(Blood on the leaves and blood at the root,)
Black body swinging in the southern breeze,
Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees.
Pastoral scene of the gallant South,
(The bulging eyes and the twisted mouth,)
Scent of magnolia, sweet and fresh,
(And the sudden smell of burning flesh.)
Here is a fruit for the crows to pluck,
For the rain to gather, for the wind to suck,
For the sun to rot, for a tree to drop,
Here is a strange and bitter crop.
HOWARD ZINN & ANTHONY ARNOVE, VOICES OF A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 326–27
(2004).
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play its proper cultural role, it must free more current raw material for
use by contemporary creators.
Rapid change justifies a shorter term of copyright, but not so brief
that it would impair incentives for the commercialization and
distribution of nondigital creative works.126 We can reconcile these
competing objectives if we shorten the term of protection of only one of
the six exclusive rights, the derivative work right. So long as users of
otherwise protected material create new derivative works, then such a
requirement would mute the impact on incentives, because the
remaining five rights would retain their (overly) lengthy terms. How
short could we make the term of protection? A range of ten to fifteen
years would prove adequate. Very few works have commercial lives of
greater length,127 and the rapid pace of cultural change warrants making
as much as possible of our recent history available to future authors.
The difficulty lies in accomplishing this result as a doctrinal matter.
The scope of the derivative work right is highly problematic,128
because existing copyright doctrine fails to adequately distinguish the
derivative work right from the reproduction right. Both require
“substantial similarity” for infringement.129 The statute itself defines a
derivative work to include an abridgement or condensation.130 A
derivative work, to constitute such a work, must contain enough original
material to support a copyright for what it adds.131 So an abridgment
126. Copyright incentives may be overrated; they may be unnecessary to spur creation, and
distribution of digital works is virtually costless.
127. “Even allowing for the optimism and self-confidence necessary in these creative and risky
fields, the wildest dreams of artists and producers probably extend no farther than ‘smash hit’ status for
their works for a year or two, and healthy sales for five or ten.” EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES 4–5 (1998).
The same study found that only about 1% of book copyrights were renewed after their initial twentyeight year term. Id. at 6. Given the compliance with technical formalities necessary to secure federal
copyrights during the period examined, a far lower proportion of protected works would have enduring
value in the current copyright era of automatic protection upon fixation.
128. Compare Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) with Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) and Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 38
F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994), aff’g without published opinion 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993). See
generally Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right,
101 GEO. L.J. 1505 (2013).
129. Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986). In deciding whether a book of
photographs could infringe a copyrighted work of choreography, the court held in response to the
plaintiff’s claim that the book was either an infringing copy or, alternatively, an infringing derivative
work, that “the standard for determining copyright infringement is not whether the original could be
recreated from the allegedly infringing copy, but whether the latter is ‘substantially similar’ to the
former.” Id. at 162.
130. “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a[n] . . . abridgement, condensation. . . .’” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
131. L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“[T]o support a
copyright [in a derivative work] there must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial
variation . . . .”).
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that qualifies as a copyrightable derivative work must contain enough
preexisting material to be substantial similar to it and also contain
enough new material to support independent copyright as a new
derivative work.132
At the same time, since any unauthorized
substantially similar work infringes the reproduction right, courts can
easily find that such a work created without authorization from the
owner of the preexisting work infringes both rights. Few cases analyze
this distinction.133
The substantial similarity test for infringement of the reproduction
right prohibits considerably more than just literal copies,134 and no
amount of original material justifies an infringing copy. 135 Whether the
two rights can be differentiated depends upon whether the definition of
derivative work can be made precise. The statutory definition provides a
laundry list of examples and adds the general category of “any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted.”136 Only
by cabining both the laundry list and the general category can the
definition be precisely delineated, but the cases are far too few to
achieve this with decisional law.
B. Requiring Fixation to Infringe the Derivative Work Right
A second and more modest reform, requiring little more than a
clarification, would encourage a more functional copyright. This reform
would require fixation137 to infringe the derivative work138 right. An
unfixed derivative work can rarely substitute for or supplant demand for
the underlying work. Successful and free experimentation with a variety
of underlying source materials for derivative works might well lead to a
subsequent, fixed derivative work for which royalties would later

132. Moreover, the threshold for copyrightability of the new material is famously low. Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
133. See generally Samuelson, supra note 128.
134. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
135. When a small portion of the plaintiff’s work is copied and the vast bulk of defendant’s
allegedly infringing work is original, the affirmative defense of fair use is typically the focus of the
litigation. The fair use evaluation analyzes the amount taken as a proportion of plaintiff’s work, not the
defendants. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
137. “A work is ‘fixed’ . . . when . . . [it] is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” Id.
138. Id. “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”
Id.
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become due. The derivative work might be all the better for the period
of royalty-free experimentation in unfixed forms, which would allow
authors to incorporate improvements and refinements derived from live
audience responses. Investments in licenses for fixed derivative works
might increase because the royalty-free period of experimentation and
development with unfixed derivative works would reduce the
uncertainty of audience demand for the work, allowing more accurate
estimates of commercial value. The current system requires a license
before creating even unfixed derivative works, forcing both the choice
of the underlying work and the monetary commitment necessary to
acquire a license before actually creating the derivative work and
gauging its potential artistic or commercial success. Without a license,
such an author risks not only infringement liability, but, even if the
adaptation is successful, the author forfeits copyright protection for the
new work.139 These proposed changes would free the live performance
of music and other categories of works to draw upon the entire body of
existing works as source material so long as the newly created derivative
works remained unfixed.140
We need only clarify existing doctrine to eliminate liability for
unfixed derivative works, since an acceptable basis already exists to
argue for the interpretation that unfixed derivative works do not
infringe. Doctrinal ambiguity arises because “[a] work is ‘created’
when it is fixed in a copy . . . .”141 Since “[a] ‘derivative work’ is a
work,”142 the statutory definition strongly implies that, to infringe the
derivative work right, the infringing work must be fixed.143
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1976 Act explicitly
contradicts this implication by stating that no fixation is required to
infringe the derivative work right.144 The courts have failed to resolve
139. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in which
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used
unlawfully.”).
140. Live broadcasts of performances with a live studio audience would in theory be permitted,
but these have become rare in contemporary broadcasting practice. Because of time zones, very few
broadcasts are likely to be completely unfixed, since the economics of broadcast schedules create strong
incentives for repeated broadcasts so that the same time schedules can be maintained in different time
zones.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “created”).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.09[A] (2006).
144. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675 and
S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 58 (1975) (emphasis added):
Preparation of derivative works.—The exclusive right to prepare derivative works, specified
separately in clause (2) of section 106, overlaps the exclusive right of reproduction to some
extent. It is broader than that right, however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in
copies or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet,
pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing is ever
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these conflicting possibilities. In dictum145 in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.
v. Nintendo of America, Inc.146 the court pronounced that “[a] derivative
work must be fixed to be protected under the Act, but not to infringe.”
It then proceeded to muddy this treatment of the fixation issue by
declaring “[a] derivative work [that infringes] must incorporate a
protected work in some concrete or permanent form.”147 The statute,
however, is unambiguous in its § 101 language, defining the moment a
work is “created” as when it is “fixed,” and a derivative work is
necessarily a “work.” Thus it is reasonable to hold that infringement of
the derivative work right requires fixation of the infringing derivative
work. Given this lack of ambiguity, one could resort to the wellestablished interpretative rule that reference to legislative history for
purposes of statutory interpretation is justified only when statutory
language is ambiguous,148 and, in the § 101 definitions, there is no
ambiguity to resolve.
Of course an unfixed derivative work could still infringe the public
performance right of the underlying work,149 because an infringing
public performance requires no fixation. However, the proposal I make,
infra, to create a royalty-free zone that would exempt live public
performances before live audiences, in order to encourage the
collaboration that occurs between audiences and performers in such an
environment, would result in exempting such a performance, in effect
limiting the public performance right to recorded media.
C. A Royalty-Free Zone for Live Public Performance
If key functions of expressive culture require either or both a
congregated audience (for emotional contagion) and a live performance
(for collaboration), then the current copyright statute fails to support
these functions.150 For purposes of public performances or public
fixed in tangible form.
145. It was dictum because the court ultimately concluded that the purported infringing work did
not constitute a derivative work because it did not recast the plaintiff’s work.
146. 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 969.
148. “Given the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative
history.” U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). See also U.S. v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 399 (1805).
149. Fair use could rebut allegations of infringing the public performance right. If the unfixed
derivative work varied substantially from the underlying work, the ephemeral nature of the unfixed
work could be an additional (optional) factor in addition to the mandatory four-factor § 107 analysis that
would weigh in favor of fair use.
150. The doctrinal approach to joint authorship, by developing a test that both permits
promiscuous collaboration with peers, friends, editors, without the risk of opportunistic “claim jumping”
by those whose opinions or advice was sought is one of the current Act’s recognition of the value of
collaboration. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200–02 (2d Cir. 1998). “The potential danger of

1328

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

displays, the Copyright Act distinguishes neither between congregated
and disaggregated audiences151 nor between the public performance of a
recording and a public live performance.152 The Act’s definition of “[t]o
perform or display a work ‘publicly’” treats as equivalents a live
performance and the transmission of a recording to isolated members of
the public, even at different places and times.153 Given the disparate
psychological and physiological outcomes from these two ways to
experience the same expressive work, copyright doctrine should not
treat them the same. Yet both are considered equivalent public
performances of the expressive work.
If emotional contagion were the sole critical function, then the statute
would appropriately distinguish a congregated audience from a
disaggregated one. Emotional contagion could occur so long as the
audience is congregated, regardless of whether the public performance is
recording, such as in a dance club, or is of a live performance
transmitted to a remote congregated audience, such as a concert on a
closed circuit telecast.154 Alternatively, if the only desired function were
collaboration, then the critical distinction would differentiate
environments where performers and audiences can interact from those
where they cannot. The statute would treat a live performance before a

allowing anyone who makes even a minimal contribution to the writing of a work to be deemed a
statutory co-author—as long as the two parties intended the contributions to merge—motivated the court
to set forth a two-pronged test.” Id. (requiring all parties to intend co-authorship).
151. The exception is found in the section 109(c) exemption to the public display right, which
permits the owner of a particular copy to publicly display that copy to viewers present at the place where
the copy is located. Since at least with respect to paintings and sculptures, the copy is often a unique
original (still defined as a “copy” under the Act, as 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides, “[t]he term ‘copies’
includes the material object . . . in which the work is first fixed.”), this is akin to a live performance in
that it privileges the congregated audience experiencing the original. On the other hand, it is unlike a
live performance because it also applies to a reproduced copy and, further, even if the original is already
permanently fixed and the act of creation occurred decades earlier, so no author and audience
collaboration is possible, although within a live congregated audience collaboration might occur in the
viewing and interpretation.
152. Only through the concept of fixation does the Act distinguish between live and recorded,
since unfixed works remain outside the scope of copyright protection.
153. “To perform or display a work “publicly” means:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered;
or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members
of the public capable or receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
154. Social media, while new and still evolving, permit some interaction among a disaggregated
audience. Some of this interaction occurs in real time, provided one multitasks and accepts the resulting
loss of cognitive resources devoted to experiencing the work. It does not yet simulate immersion in a
crowd of enthusiastic fans.
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live audience155 differently from a live audience receiving remotely.
However, the realization of the full, hypothesized functions of
expressive culture requires both congregation of the audience and live
performance.
D. Limiting the Public Performance Right
A live performer before a live audience implicates the same right as
merely playing a recording for the same audience.156 The same right
applies even if those listening to the recording are not gathered together
in one place but are dispersed in place, time, or both. If the social
experience of public performance animated copyright policy, then this
uniform treatment would change, because it neglects the widely
divergent experiences of these variant “audiences.”
If performance rights varied by the nature of the audience’s
experience, copyright policy could reduce the competitive cost
advantage of recordings over live performances in order to encourage
more live performances. Unless it is being recorded, a live public
performance of a musical work should fall outside the scope of the
public performance right. Making such performances royalty-free
encourages live performances, offering the potential for creative
interaction between performers and audience.157 Eliminating monetary
payment provides an obvious benefit, although a less obvious but
perhaps more significant benefit might be the elimination of transaction
costs, which would allow more spontaneous selection of material, a
critical factor in the creative process, and opportunistic use of temporary
performance venues.
The immediate audience response, effectively a collaboration with the
performing artist, provides uniquely valuable criticism that recording
studios and music industry executives cannot provide. A live performer
with a live audience is immersed in the social interaction of the audience
response, which may approximate the evolutionary milieu which
155. As opposed to a live audience receiving a transmission.
156. The statute does distinguish among the types of work involved, as this proposal does. The
current statute grants no public performance rights to sound recordings (as distinct from the underlying
musical work) unless the performance is by digital audio transmission, thus exempting analogue radio
broadcasts. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
157. Currently, § 110(4) exempts live amateur and free performances of nondramatic literary
works or musical works. See id. § 110(4). Prior to the invention of recording technologies, amateur
performance offered the predominant way to experience much of our expressive culture. Amateur
musical groups performed for themselves or an audience drawn from their immediate community or
social networks, and book groups engaged in public readings of the leading works of their day. The
existing exemption encourages social consumption of our expressive culture. Such performances are
artifacts from a vanished era, but with certain modifications, we could create more effective incentives
to encourage such performances.

1330

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

generated our need to make musical works.
Neither favoring the social experience of works nor limiting the
public performance right is totally alien to the Copyright Act. The
current public performance right is rife with exemptions. The 1976 Act
established some limited incentives for social consumption. Two of the
limited exemptions of public performance from infringement liability in
§ 110, teaching158 and religious worship,159 can be justified easily as
recognition of the social context in which works are experienced during
these activities. The teaching exemption applies only to performances
or displays in “face-to-face teaching activities” and the religious
exemption covers only performances or displays “in the course of
services at a place of worship or other religious assembly.” In the
exempt contexts, participants would interact socially, and the resulting
benefits they receive reflect both this interaction as well as the
consumption of the copyrighted work. The benefits derived from these
dual sources could be deemed to outweigh the economic loss to
copyright owners created by the exemptions. In a teaching environment,
the learning experience depends upon the conflicts, contrasts, and
comparisons that derive from the competing perceptions,
understandings, and interpretations of the work experienced by
participants in the learning group. In the religious context, the
communal, shared experience of participatory worship is largely the
point of the experience. Participants do not experience the expressive
work for their own sakes but as an instrument to achieve their
educational or religious purposes. In some respects, these exemptions
are analogous to fair use exemptions. The contributions of the
participants to their experiences of the works create social benefits160
above and beyond the unmediated value of the work alone.
A related provision used by art galleries and museums depends upon
the limitation of the public display right contained in § 109 (c), 161 which
exempts the public display of a work, typically visual art, to a live
158. See id. § 110(1)–(2).
159. See id. § 110(3).
160. Other § 110 exemptions benefit nonprofit or voluntary groups by indirectly subsidizing their
charitable activities, and if these promote social cohesion, then the exemptions support this effort too.
Section 110(10) exempts performances of nondramatic literary or musical works in the course of social
functions organized and promoted by nonprofit veterans organizations or nonprofit fraternal
organizations to which the general public is not invited, if the proceeds are used exclusively for
charitable purposes and not for financial gain. Id. § 110(10). Section 110(6) exempts performance of
nondramatic musical works by a governmental body or nonprofit agricultural or horticultural
organization in the course of an annual fair or exhibition. Id. § 110(6).
161. “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular copy lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one
image at time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located.” Id. § 109(c).
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audience. Even a copy of the original work can be similarly displayed.
At least at gallery openings for newly created works, which the artist
typically attends, a live audience interacts with the artist to mutual
benefit. In addition, the author probably suffers no loss of income from
the exemption, since such displays usually enhance sales of the artist’s
works or enhance her reputation, increasing the value of her work.
Charging the public admission would decrease attendance in what is
functionally a retail store.
Changing the public performance right as proposed above would
reverse more than a century of music practice, but it would not venture
into unfamiliar policy territory. Only with the 1897 amendments did the
public performance of musical works come within the exclusive
copyright grant.162 It took a further two decades for the courts to
establish that the now-superseded “for profit” requirement did not
necessitate a separate admission charge for music to find
infringement.163 This change would have little effect on the incomes of
composers, since the public performance of recordings generates most
of their incomes from the public performance right. As in the era before
recordings, they would still receive royalties from the increased sales of
sheet music necessary for live performers to learn their music. This
seems a small price to pay to adapt copyright to our social species.
The public performance right is already complicated and
differentiated by subcategories. The public performance right protected
dramatic works for more than 40 years before it covered musical
performances, and even then it initially applied only to musical
performances “for profit.”164
Within the music category, the
compulsory license applies only to the subcategory of nondramatic
musical works.165 Analog public performances of sound recordings are
exempt, since § 106(6) applies only to digital audio transmissions.166
Various exemptions within § 110 differentiate using various criteria,
including the following: whether the performance involves face to face
teaching at a nonprofit educational institution,167 whether the work
performed is a dramatic or nondramatic work,168 whether the
performance occurs in the course of a religious assembly, 169 whether the
162. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481, 481–82 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(4) (2012)).
163. See Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 593–95 (1917).
164. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1080–1081 (1909).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (“In the case of nondramatic musical works, the exclusive
rights . . . are subject to compulsory licensing. . . .”).
166. Id. § 106(6).
167. Id. § 110(1).
168. Id. § 110(2) & (6).
169. Id. § 110(3).
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performance is an amateur one,170 the size of the retail establishment,171
the nature and amount of electronic hardware used,172 the organizational
purpose of the sponsoring organization,173 the purpose of retail
promotion,174 and whether the intended audience or performers have
visual or auditory handicaps.175 Compared to the complexity of these
categories, the difference between live performers and recordings and
between live audiences and others appears straightforward.
Moreover, the exemption from copyright protection for live
performances is not altogether out of character with the current statute.
Of the six exclusive rights, four, the reproductive right, the derivative
work right,176 the distribution right, and the public performance of sound
recordings by digital audio transmission right, assume fixation in copies
and are concerned with the exploitation of those copies. A fifth right,
the public display right, exempts the public display of a lawfully owned
copy when the audience is present at the place of display, essentially an
exemption for a live display.177 Copyright is primarily concerned with
copies, and privileging live performance does not contradict this
emphasis.
E. Economic Consequences of a Functional Approach to Copyright
What would be the economic consequences for performers, content
owners, and authors if such live public performances with live audiences
occurred in a royalty-free zone? It might reduce licensing income, but it
might increase performance fees. To the extent some composers are not
performers and some performers are not composers, such a change
might redistribute revenues between performers and composers, but its
initial effects could be revenue-neutral, and its long-term effects might
be strongly beneficial if it strengthens our expressive culture.
The bulk of copyrighted works generate most of their revenues for
authors and content owners from the sale and performance of
recordings, with the exceptions of live theater and dance. Books, sound
recordings, and movies are recordings by definition, and the revenues
170. Id. § 110(4).
171. Id. § 110(5)(B)(i) & (ii).
172. Id. § 110(5)(A); 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(i) (I) & (II).
173. Id. § 110(6) & (10).
174. Id. § 110(7).
175. Id. § 110(8).
176. The derivative work right presupposes copies as a matter of statutory interpretation, since it
is a “work” which is only created upon fixation. However, the legislative history of the Act indicates
that Congress thought that a derivative work could exist without fixation. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong. 2nd Session, p. 62 (1976).
177. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012).
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from these works would remain unaffected. Through the end of the
nineteenth century, authors generated substantial incomes from oral
readings of their works. Currently such appearances, when they still
occur in the contemporary copyright economy, are usually free and done
to promote sales of the book.178 Music is about the only content that,
while generating the bulk of its revenues from sales or performances of
recordings, still generates significant revenues from live performances,
and this share is increasing.179 In any royalty-free zone for live
performances, music composers would lose the revenues collected on
their behalf by performing rights organizations from live performance
venues. When the live performers are themselves the composers, they
would probably lose no revenue, because their appearance fees could
increase to compensate, and the performance venue’s costs would
remain unchanged. The only revenues lost to the creative side of the
music industry would be performance royalties generated from venues
that feature live music groups performing cover songs, since these
composers would receive neither appearance fees for performing nor
public performance royalties.
Perhaps the most significant loss to authors would be from the loss of
public performance royalties for drama and dance. Playwrights and
choreographers would lose royalties from the performances of their
works by others. This loss might be offset somewhat by an increase in
the number of productions, since they would become cheaper to produce
because of the exemption from the royalty obligation, and increased
royalties from the sale of the copies needed to perform them since
178. Matthew
Pearl,
Dickens
v
American,
MORE
INTELLIGENT
LIFE,
http://moreintelligentlife.com/story/dickens-vs-america (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). Dickens found his
second American lecture tour so lucrative that he made 38,000 pounds from seventy-six public readings.
When “he died a year and a half later, more than 20% of his estate’s assets had come from this
American tour.” Id.
“Authors’ public readings of their works flourished in the nineteenth century to a degree that had not
been experienced in Western Europe for nearly two thousand years.” STEVEN ROGER FISCHER, A
HISTORY OF READING 275 (2003).
179. BMI reported $944 million in revenue for its fiscal year ending June 30, 2013. Press Release,
BMI, Broadcast Music Inc. Reports Record-Breaking Revenues of $944 Million (Sept. 23, 2013),
http://www.bmi.com/press/entry/563077. Of this amount, $116 million came from bars, restaurants, and
other commercial establishments. Id. A significantly smaller share would derive from live performance
venue licenses, since the category reported includes everything from Muzak in dental offices or
telephone on-hold, to bars and restaurants playing background music. See id. The resulting residual
amount would be the upper bound for the amounts lost with a further reduction from the amounts that
would accrue to the performers.
ASCAP is the other major Performing Rights Organization. BMI and ASCAP reportedly account
for 98% of performing rights licensing revenues. Music Licensing, INT’L MUNI. LAW. ASS’N,
http://www.imla.org/component/content/article/23-programs/112-music-licensing (last visited Aug. 18,
2014); Sheridon Lyons, Song Fees Have Towns Singing Their Own Blues, BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 8,
2003),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-09-08/news/0309080288_1_manchester-carroll-countysmall-town.
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productions would become cheaper to stage. If the financial impact on
playwrights and choreographers were too great, these forms could just
be exempted from a royalty-free zone, since recordings of dances or
plays, presented as such, are infrequently made.
What might be the cultural consequences for such a royalty-free
zone? In such a zone, any works could be performed live, so long as no
fixation occurred, and variations could evolve with none of the chill
derived from fear of creating infringing derivative works. Creating a
royalty-free zone does not require that we give up any of the advantages
recordings offer. Instead, recordings could be made and could
conventionally exploit any creative innovations spurred by such a zone.
The benefit of a royalty-free zone would be a richer cultural life, richer
in the functional sense, given the hypothetical purposes of expressive
culture.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1909, technological innovation has given us convenient and
inexpensive access to almost the entire recorded history of the world’s
cultures, but it has also helped eliminate the social context in which we
once experienced our culture. We know too little about ourselves or the
functions expressive culture serves to blithely accept this unexamined
consequence of technological innovation. We are fundamentally a
social species, and recognition of this social aspect should rightly inform
copyright policy.
Restructuring copyright to make it more suitable for a social species
implies a reduction in the scope of its monopoly, but such a reduction
risks neither a decline in innovation nor the potential future of our
cultural heritage. We have assigned too much value to the incentive
granted by the ever-expanding copyright monopoly. The United States
achieved world dominance in expressive culture, much to the annoyance
of the rest of the world, with the idiosyncratic, hyper-technical 1909
Act, which granted much weaker property rights than those granted in
Europe or by our own 1976 Act. Even with the current, expanded scope
of protection, innovation has occurred, but outside of the copyright
system, most notably with the development of hip-hop. Cutting back a
few of these expansive grants risks little and promises to reduce
inhibitions on innovation by creating a legal environment more
compatible with our social nature as a species.
The opposite view, implicit in the current copyright regime, holds that
expressive culture performs no vital function and satisfies no essential
need. Expressive culture is an economic phenomenon, whose worth is
appropriately measured by the economic revenues it generates as a
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product. In this case, expressive culture is only mind candy, and only
the calories consumed, i.e., revenues generated, matter. Since we
already possess enough expressive works to last all our lifetimes, and
since the reproduction and distribution of digital works costs virtually
nothing, we no longer need copyright incentives for these works. New
works merely appeal to foolish and inconsequential tastes for novelty.
The copyright monopoly then contributes only friction to the economy,
a dead weight loss on society, sustained only by unrelenting rentseeking by corporate content owners.
But if expressive culture plays an essential role in our social and
psychological development and is truly food for the soul, then counting
mere calories distracts us from identifying whether our expressive
culture nourishes us, whether it serves the necessary functions for which
it evolved in all known human societies, and we evolved to produce to
help sustain our lives and societies.
I have identified and summarized some of the possible adaptive
functions of expressive culture. I have also identified the research that
specifies the physiological mechanisms that account for the functions.
This research is still preliminary, and some of the findings might fairly
be categorized as speculative, but then so is almost all copyright policy
analysis. Those who would reject a functional approach to copyright
policy must still produce a satisfactory answer to the question: What is
expressive culture for?

